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INTRODUCTION

This thesis will deal with the relationship be¬
tween the huge American steel industry and the public in¬
terest,

in an exploration of past problems designed to

shed light on the problems of the present.
In April of 1962 the importance of the steel
industry in the economy of this nation was once again
brought to the attention of the public,

when an increase

in steel prices precipitated Presidential action in an
attempt to force the companies to rescind the increases.
The price

increases had followed a labor settlement

which was reported to have cost eleven cents per employee
hour,

a relatively small settlement for the industry.

Prices had not risen in several years,

and evidently the

officials in the companies felt it was time for an increase,
though the President obviously did not.
Although the 1962 incident is the focal point for
this investigation,

it is the characteristics of the in¬

dustry which become the central problem in the relationship
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of steel to the public interest.

This thesis is an attempt

to set forth for readers some of the basic problems
existing today.

CHAPTER I

THE PUBLIC INTEREST

It is usual to think of the public interest as com¬
posed of the
can be

collective

interests of all those

called the public.

in terms

of the

interests

collectively compose
recognize

three

business,

government,

seems to the

It is useful,

however,

to think

of several major sectors vfoich

the public

sectors

citizens who

interest.

This paper will

in addition to the general public:

and labor.

This socio-political view

author to represent realistically the existing

situation in this country.
The
in the
the

general public encompasses the many individuals

country,

four,

and obviously this

including members

sification.

The

other groups

as well as responsibility for the

of other groups.

For example,

the

ment has a responsibility to represent the

Federal Govern¬

general public,

to hear the many lobbies of labor and business,
the

same

time

the

in its clas¬

other three groups are meant to convey the

concept of self-interest,
interests

of the

is the broadest group of

Government is

3-
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while

itself an interest,

at

and is

4
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in a position to maintain its interest.
These major classifications encompass many smaller
groups,

i.e

business could be classified by industry,

type of organization,
bilities.

or by region,

by

to name a few possi¬

One can begin to think about these four groups in

these terms for some time before a lost sense of futility
or exhaustion sets in.

But these are the terms of the con¬

cept called the public interest.
This brings us to recognize the interplay of forces
in society,

where everyone has a multitude of interests.

single individual may belong to many interest groups,
country,

state,

county,

city,

A

from

down to church, business in-

%

dustry and firm,

or labor group,

and on to small interest

groups such as local parent-teacher groups,
type activities.

or other lodge

The many interests of the many people who

compose the public make it almost impossible to determine
the state of the public interest at any one time.
In terms of the steel community,

it is easily seen

that the interest of the largest ten producers may in itself
be diverse,
terest,

and when one thinks of the total public in¬

the steel companies play a part which is small in

terms of individual entities in the country that has
an interest.

But In economic terms the interest of these

5-
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companies is major,

for analysis of the economy indicates

that steel plays a very large part in the price levels,
which have been moving upward for some years.
Kaplan points out that the 361 largest business
corporations in this country account for approximately 70
billion dollars of total assets, which is comparable to

1
the 70 billion held by 3.6 million small enterprises.

This

points to the power of the large corporation in our society,
and perhaps provides insight into the large amounts of regu¬
lation and surveillance Americans behold.
The public interest is an abstract representation of
concrete activities and interplays in the total American
system,

and must be defined in terms of values on a philo¬

sophic basis.

It is composed of considerations which are

social, philosophical, political,
ethical,

legal,

and psychological.

religious,

economic, moral,

In other words,

it is

complicated not only by the multitude of facets it en¬
compasses, but also by the many groups and forces it molds.
The public interest is a fluid phenomenon which adapts to

A. D. H. Kaplan, Big Enterprise in a Competitive
System (Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, 1954),
pp. 116-118.
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changing circumstances on one hand,

and changes circum¬

stances to adjust them to its requirements on the other
hand.

It is not only that in which the public is in¬

terested, but also what is best for the total American
system,

for the public will be interested in the many

small individual matters which confront it,

as well as

national and international matters.
In the representative system which we have in this
country, politics enters into the considerations government
members must constantly appraise.

There are many favors

and accommodations which are involved,

and these must be

considered when discussing the actions taken by government
members in terms of implementing the public interest.

Hence

we find that in many cases these people must make judgments
regarding what they believe to be the public interest in
fact.

This obviously is difficult,

of human frailty,

given a certain degree

and the finiteness of the human mind.

The

people have entrusted a good part of the responsibility for
guarding the public interest in these people,

in all facets

of government.
However,
is overwhelming,

because the enormity of the public interest
responsibility rests equally on the shoulders

of all individuals-and groups in the country.

When this

7-
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responsibility is scorned or simply overlooked,

the govern¬

ment must make a judgment regarding appropriate actions to
be taken.
1962,

In the case of the steel controversy of April,

the judgment was that the steel community had a large

responsibility which was scorned,

and the government took

measures to bring the industry to consider that responsi¬
bility.

This is obviously a qualitative judgment,

for there

are not always rules to follow in such unusual circumstances.
Each situation is different,

and one can only think in terms

of his own view of totality,

and in terms of the objectives

toward which society is working,

not only in the present,

but also in the future.
There can be little doubt that the government has made
mistakes in the past.

But this does not mean that the

problems will disappear;

the decisions must be made,

and in

1962 the President, elected by the nation to oversee the
matters for which he has responsibility,

chose to pressure

the steel community for a rescission of price increases.
There were many problems involved,

including the legal

aspects which stemmed from the hint of illegal collusion on
the part of the companies,

due to the rapid manner in which

all the prices were raised.
National policy in connection with the public interest

8-
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can not be made by any one branch of the government entirely,
but decisive action in short time demanded executive
determination in defense of a judgment.

There seemed to

be political implications involved in the controversy,
stemming from the long term relationship between steel,

labor,

2
and government.
The public interest is concerned with optimization
of the results of forces involved in the dynamic interplay
of society,
justice,

and is represented by such terms as good,

equality,

or equity.

The concept of the public

interest is not precisely stated here,
precise phenomenon.

right,

because it is not a

But it does involve the use of forces

to mold the interests of the parts into seme equitable re¬
lationship within the whole, which is composed of the parts,
and the multitude of relationships existing among the parts.
The public interest,

at the time of the crisis and

thereafter, was affected in several ways.

Certainly the

See The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times
for the period between April 10 and 30, 1962, for many
articles on the controversy.
Other articles on the details
leading up to the controversy and those ensuing from it are
available in the news media, and will not be repeated here.
One source on the events connected with the controversy is
Grant McConnell, Steel and the Presidency, 1962 (New York:
W. W. Norton & Co.r 1963).
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price

increases gave

Perhaps more

companies a psychological

inflation fear caused a good deal of concern

time.
The

President was placed in a delicate position,

the entire program of the
if the

generally,

suffered

companies

the prices

in the

steel

industry,

for feeling duped

increase prices.

firms generally began to foresee

of their products.

implications,

in

after the rescission there was a de¬

even speculated that perhaps the
decline was related to the
Other ways

increases

But regardless of this prospect

pressed feeling in the business community.

Some people

subsequent stock market

actions of the President.

in which the public interest was affected

included the moral implications

involved in the relationships

existing among the various parties,
the price

and perhaps

after demanding small wage packages only to

Business

and its

Labor,

would certainly have had a cause

or cheated,
the

administration might have

for

President lost influence over business and labor by

doing nothing.

see

lift.

important was the psychological effect on the

general public;
at the

the

increases,

the economic effects of

and the philosophical

implications of

opposing political views held by Republican businessmen
and Democratic administration members.

10-
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This capsule view of the public interest can lead
us into a short discussion of social control of business,
before we enter the realm of economic factors which will
comprise a good portion of the paper.

Much more could be

said, but this paper cannot encompass the magnitude of
the public interest, which is a subject for many possible
volumes.

CHAPTER II

SOCIAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS

In April,

1962,

all four of the parties comprising

the public interest were involved,

though some were more

directly and completely participating.
tion actually preceded the crisis.

The labor participa¬

The parties in actual

conflict were the major steel companies with some exceptions,
and the Federal Government.
r

The crisis atmosphere involved several forms of con¬
flict; mental in the sense of theory or rationale;
in the sense of combat or restraint;
sense of indecision or anguish.
today,

physical

and emotional in the

This conflict exists even

as it existed before the April,

1962 clash,

for the

incident under investigation merely brings to our attention
the many basic problems which underlie the efficient func¬
tioning of the total American system.
opponents prepare,
strategies,
subdued;

Between rounds the

gather facts and arguments,

and wait for new events to occur.

devise new
The crisis is

it may be analogous to the concept of a cold war

within our system.

It requires constant effort and vigilance.

11-
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The

flow of activity in our system is made possible

by the continual operation and interaction of many sub¬
systems which have varying nature;

the four major institu¬

tional components of our society represent systems of a
particular sort,

in terms of the public interest.

there are other systems,
economic system,

But

such as the legal system and the

which are different ways of viewing the

dynamics of organized phenomena called institutions,
frameworks,

or

or some such name.

One particular subsystem in which this chapter will
have interest is the business community,

and its relations

with other subsystems such as the legal, economic,
public,

labor,

general

and government subsystems.

For many years it was thought that our particular
system would function most efficiently and beneficially
through minimization of government interference with busi¬
ness policies and procedures.

Labor unions were either non¬

existent or non-powerful during many of these years,

and the

scope of American government activities was tiny in comparison
to the present. Business was a major factor in society.
Smith talked of an "invisible hand" which would guide the
destiny of men into the greatest social good,

through the

Adam

13-
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self ish profit motives of each individual business firm.
The businessman was respected,

and his activities did not

disturb people very much in comparison with the present
circumstances.

There were instances of disturbance,

e.g.,

business in its treatment of labor in certain working condi¬
tions, which formed a major long term problem.

The American

system being what it is, most of these problems found solu¬
tions,

sometimes workable,

sometimes not.

Over the years profound changes occurred.

The

atomistic type of competition which confronted Adam Smith
is virtually non-existent in modern America,

save parts of

the farm market, which even now is being affected by sub¬
sidies which modify the conditions of competition.

In place

of atomistic competition is found the corporate giant,
monopolistic competition,

in monopoly,

in oligopoly,

in

and in

new types of arrangements for which satisfactory solutions
<

have not been worked out.
These

features of modern America are the foundation

for huge mass production systems,

and rapid economic growth,

while providing equally enormous problems for men to solve.

W.

R.

Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations
Scott (ed.) (1925).

(An Inquiry Into),

-14-

These conditions are the creations of man,
for as he created them,

and his problems,

so he must live with them.

The complexities of these modern circumstances are
visible to even the most cursory eye,
into them here is impossible.

and to delve deeply

The following chapters on

economic factors involved in the steel situation will point
this out quite sufficiently and vividly.
The function of this chapter is to point out that an
enormous problem does exist for man to solve.

The power of

the corporate complex is certainly not diminishing.
take only one example.

To

General Motors last year reported a

net profit after 52% taxes of more than one billion dollars.
When one stops to think of the numbers of people employed by
such a corporation in its many divisions,

and about the

tremendous amounts of capital controlled by a handful of
key executives,

it becomes clear that the individual is

dwarfed by the firm in many ways.

As a citizen he must ask

his government to take a hand in controlling the corpora¬
tion,
are

to learn about its activities,

to ensure its actions

for the betterment of society as a whole.

General Motors Company Report,

1962.

Hence we have
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today social control of business coining mainly through govern
ment activity and intervention into many areas of business
3
and labor activity.
In the American steel industry we find a structure of
firms which are large and to a certain degree integrated.
There are certain types of facilities used in steel produc¬
tion which operate most efficiently in complexes, and other
types which are large and expensive.

The industry is highly

concentrated in that the largest ten firms control over
eighty per cent of total industry capacity.

The economic

characteristics of the industry will be seen in the next two
chapters.
Many of the problems involved in the steel industry
are of a controversial nature due to our inability to come
to agreement on the degree to which steel influences the
economy, or to which the steel industry is responsible for
inflation in this country, or is responsible for a balance
of payments problem.

These questions are basic to the long

J. M. Clark, Social Control
of Chicago, 1926), Chapter I, where
social control is not exclusively a
and that government intervention is
of the public, but sometimes for an

of Business (University
Clark points out that
government activity,
not always on behalf
interest group.

-16-

term relationship of government and steel which will be
discussed here in this paper.
The government has intervened in various manners
over the years into the activities of the steel industry.
The beginning of this intervention is not important,

but

one of the first events which brought forth interest of
government in steel was the formation of the United States
Steel Corporation through a merger of many small companies
in 1901.

This giant corporation has been the center of at¬

tention in the steel industry every since.
The government made an attempt to decrease the power
of the company in a case that took ten years, at the end of
4
which the government lost.
The industry has been the sub¬
ject of many Congressional inquiries over the years in an
attempt by the government to learn more about its activities,
and in reaction to price increases by the

industry.

Other

methods and instances of intervention at various times are
5
also on record.
Many of the instances of intervention have come during

417

^United States v. United States Steel Corp.,
(1920).

251 U.S.

^See Collective Bargaining in the Basic Steel Industry
(U.S. Dept, of Labbr, 1961) for background; also see the
other sources in the Public Document section of the final
bibliography.

17-

-

or after labor settlements.

The usual pattern in labor

negotiations is that the union makes high demands,
cases a strike comes,

steel prices rise,

government bear the burden.

in sane

and the public or

If government action comes,

businessmen argue about free enterprise and the efforts of
the government to take over business,

as can be seen by

reading the Wall Street Journal during any of these crises.
In an attempt to pin down some of these gray areas
where no facts are facts and where few rules are workable,
we will discuss depreciation, prices,
productivity,

costs,

and the economy,

profits,

competition,

steel and the business cycle,

and steel and inflation.

steel

CHAPTER III

SOME ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF
THE STEEL INDUSTRY

Depreciation

The concept of depreciation is not peculiar to the
steel industry,

and its discussion here will serve the pur¬

pose of explaining the current arguments on depreciation to
a limited degree, while also evaluating the particular case
of depreciation and the steel industry.
Depreciation provides a method for the recovery of
cash outlays for fixed assets,

i.e., buildings, machinery,

and equipment of a long term nature.

These assets must be

purchased before production can begin, but the recovery of
the invested cash will not come for many years as each piece
produced brings in a little cash which can be thought of as
return of capital.

On the income statement of a firm,

revenue minus expenses equals profits.

sales

Part of the category

labeled expenses is depreciation, which is an expense of
production, but is a non-cash expense,

or non-cash charge

in terms of the current income statement.

18-
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As cash accumulates.
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the

outlay for heavy equipment is returned.
In times when the price

complications are

introduced.

rising a company may be
a new piece

level

is changing,

When prices are

additional

continuously

forced to pay a good deal more

of equipment to replace

a worn out piece.

for
There

is a possibility for gradual erosion of business assets to
occur because

the

depreciation methods allowed for tax

purposes do not recognize
it is also possible
more productive

changing price

that a new piece

than the

is not truly indicative

old piece,

levels.

However,

of equipment will be
in which case

cash cost

of the economic situation.

Depreciation should provide enough funds through its
non-cash charges to income to bring back the
of dollars to the
some

firms argue

original amount

firm on a historical cost basis.

However,

that depreciation under conditions of

changing prices should bring back dollars which will provide
equal buying power as the
others

argue

to replace

original outlay had,

while

still

depreciation should bring back enough dollars

an asset when worn.

A fourth view is that de¬

preciation should bring back enough dollars to represent
actual wear,

if the equipment were

reappraised each year

1
according to current construction costs.

^Gardiner Means,
(New York:

Pricing Power and the Public Interest

Harper & Brothers,

1962),

pp.

86-90.
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The
methods are
the

steel companies have
insufficient

argued that depreciation

(for tax purposes)

in returning to

firm enough dollars to avoid gradual erosion of capital.

This argument arises to justify price increases,
companies have used it extensively.

and the

The most pronounced

usage seems to come from the United States Steel Corporation,

2
and that firm has published its views.

The company argument is that depreciation allowed is
less than the amount needed,
One

company estimate

and the

deficiency is cumulative.

of the extent of this deficiency was
3

$904 million from 1940 to 1957.
tion was not given,

The basis

for the

calcula¬

but Means has pointed out that the

figure was based on an index of construction costs that used
1913

as a base

year,

and included factors of facility con¬

struction which did not seem to fit the reality of current
steel

facility construction,

i.e.,

200 hours of unskilled
4

labor,

no skilled labor,

and other material costs.

The company argument seems convincing at first
glance,

but the data upon which to make a judgment is

Steel and Inflation:

Fact vs.

United States Steel Corporation,
151-161,

1958);

49-53.

3Ibid.,

p.

^Means,

op.

34.
cit.,

pp.

105-107.

Fiction
see pp.

(New York:
34-36,
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scarce*

One

available,

analysis which

is reasonably well done

is

though based on inadequate data and some

assumptions necessary under the

circumstances.

limiting

This

is the
5

analysis to which the
The

analysis compares

through the use
change
1953,
year

author will turn

can be

for evidence.

figures over a period of years,

of a base year from which a percentage

calculated.

The base

years used were

1942 and

and the writer pointed out that changing the base
in the

calculations may drastically alter the

This can be verified by checking the
outside

analyses where

three

company,

results.

union,

and

different base years were used,

6
1939,

1940,

and 1942.

Because

of the

rising price

per ton of steelmaking capacity,
37% between 1942 and 1953.
together rose

levels,

net

fixed capital

based on book value,

rose

Fixed capital and working capital

31% in that period on the

same basis.

The

capital return increased 50% during the period so that on a
book value basis,

return is

sufficient to cover increased

capital outlays.
In the

5Ibid.,

6
151-161

See

company argument several different

pp.

ibid;

ideas

can

86-111.

also Steel and Inflation,

op.

cit.,

pp.
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be found regarding what depreciation should do,

and the

three things which seem to be in that argument are those
(above)
wear.

on equal buying power,

replacement cost,

and actual

The analyst felt that replacement cost might not

always be a valid argument for depreciation need not replace
a new plant as long as it provides dollars of equal buying
/

power.

For example,

if a plant were to be depreciated over

twenty years and cost a million dollars,

ten years of de¬

preciation would provide half of a million dollars.
price level then doubled,
lion,

If the

replacement cost would be two mil¬

and depreciation would have to be tripled to meet that

while it would only have to be doubled to meet equal buying
power,

for the remaining half million of buying power would

mean recovering one million at the doubled price level.
Hence 1.5 million would be recovered from equal buying power,
but 2 million would have to be recovered under replacement
cost.

Only the 1.5 million makes any economic sense,

cording to the writer,
buying power basis,

ac¬

and it appears that on an equal

net fixed capital per ton increased

59% from 1942 to 1953, while total capital per ton increased
46%,

and those would be covered by the 50% increase in capital

return over the period.
Turning to reproduction costs,

one finds that the

23-
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company argument is based on the assertion that "a^ blast
furnace"

is always the same.

One of the company officials

called them "practically identical."
on the output of those

Here are the figures

"practically identical" furnaces:

rated capacity per furnace per day in 1929 was 665 tons;
1939,

783 tons;

in 1948,

902 tons;

and in 1956,

in
7
1030 tons.

The analyst felt that the service performed was being re¬
built,

not the physical plant.

A further example is a

specific blast furnace which the company discussed.

The

furnace was built in 1910 and renovated in 1946, with an in¬
crease in cost of 460% over the 1910 cost.

But the 1910

capacity was 470 tons per day, while the 1946 capacity was
1509 tons per day.
The actual cost increase was not 460%,
8
but rather 75%.
The furnace also required only one-fourth
the labor input after renovation,

and it is likely that

there was a material saving too.
The company estimate on the increase in construction
costs between 1913 and 1956 was almost 600%, based on the
index of the Engineering News-Record
has weights unchanged since 1913,

7

Steel and Inflation,

op.

Q
Means,

op. cit.,

p.

104.

(mentioned above), which

and includes 40% common

cit., p.

58.

24-
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labor.

The analyst substitutes another index of the

Engineering News-Record which he feels more appropriately
employs skilled labor,

and is substantially similar,

and

finds that index rose only 331% in the same period.
Comparing the specific blast furnace above on this
index, we find that from 1910 to 1946 the index rose 172%,
while the actual cost rise as shown above was only 75%,
much less than even the more valid index.
The analyst concludes that it is likely that a figure
smaller than book value figures would emerge from a competent
estimate of the reproduction cost of facilities on the books
in 1942,

due to the high average age of the old equipment

and the technical superiority of the new equipment.

Hence

as of 1953 there is no reason to reject historical cost as
the proper basis until the company presents convincing evi¬
dence to the contrary.
The analysis was carried forth to 1959 and reached
similar conclusions,
years is even more

while stating that the data for these

inadequate.

burden of proof upon the

The analyst thus places the

industry,

stating that book value

could be adjusted either on buying power or reproduction
cost,

given that the company could show facts.

In either

case the result would be moderately higher than book values.

25-

-

The arguments of the companies seem exaggerated,

although

one has no way of knowing if the preceding analysis is cor¬
rect,

or if the analyst was biased unconsciously.

The analysis

does, however,

disprove to some extent the $904 million
9
figure the company showed.

Productivity

Another company argument in defense of price in¬
creases centers on rate of increase in productivity.

This

concept is more difficult than depreciation to evaluate;

no

consensus can be found on what measures should be used to
measure productivity, what the true rate of productivity in¬
crease in steel or the country is,

or which of the two

should be used as a guide for policy.
to efficiency in use of resources,

Productivity refers

and if such resources

are used increasingly more efficiently and fully,
will receive more output from a given input,

a firm

and productivity

is said to be increasing.
The arguments are that the statistics on rate of in¬
crease in national productivity are

^Steel and Inflation,

op.

inadequate;

cit.,

p.

34.

the Steelworkers
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union feels company productivity is increasing much more
rapidly than the company feels it is.

Some people use out¬

put per man hour to measure productivity, which others say
is inadequate;
investment unit

the true measure being output per total factor
(whatever that is).

The last argument above

stems from the feeling that productivity is due to increased
capital spending and efficiency as well as to increased
labor productivity. Another factor which determines
productivity is capacity usage,

and steel is tied to the

business cycle,

limiting efficiencies of high capacity usage
10
especially in light of the over-capacity of the industry.
The United Steelworkers of America is the bargaining
agent for steel employees

(hereafter called the union),

the contention of that union is that wage
led to price increases;

indeed,

and

increases have not

the union feels that even

11
higher wage increases could be met from productivity gains.

12
The company contends that this is not so.
The figures used are total employment costs,

and are

°See "Wages, Prices, Profits, and Productivity," The
15th American Assembly (New York:
Columbia University, 1959),
for a thorough discussion of the concepts included in this
section.
^Steel and Inflation,

12Ibid..

pp.'114-126.

op.

cit.,

p.

114.
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usually based on output per man hour.

The company attempts

to compare output per man hour paid for with cost per man
hour worked.

In that case output is going to be lowered

since more hours are paid for than are worked, while cost is
going to seem increased since fewer hours are worked.

This

type of presentation does not help to clarify matters.
parties

(union and management)

each other,

The

wage a propaganda battle with

and this represents problems in terms of an

objective analysis.

They can not agree on what exactly

should be included in employment costs with the union
focusing in many cases on wages while forgetting fringe
benefits.
The analysis by the economist the company chose found
that productivity increased 56.3% between 1940 and 1956,
while employment costs per man hour increased 211%.

However,

this is where the difference in hours worked and hours paid
must be watched.

Nothing is mentioned about total labor

cost per ton of steel.

The analysis continues to attempt to

disprove many of the union contentions,

while pointing out

flaws in the union argument such as stating a union view that
it had been forced to seek increases over the level of
productivity, which contradicted an earlier statement that
more could have been absorbed through productivity gains.
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The analysis continues,

stating that productivity is

not increasing at an accelerating rate, but rather at a
decelerating rate.

Figures are then presented which the

analyst feels show that steel wages have outstripped national
productivity over the past years.
watched carefully,

These arguments must be

for the companies and the union will

seek to prove anything which looks better for themselves.
A more objective analysis is presented by an economist
who is interested in the industry (same man as in the pre13
ceding section on depreciation),
which we shall move into
after citing certain other sources.
The management figures on productivity have been
14
given and they range from 2.5 to 2.9 per cent per year.
The companies also rely on findings regarding the use of all
inputs when figuring productivity,

and on results indicating

the long term trend in national productivity to be 1.7%
from 1889 to present, and 2.1% from World War I to the
15
present.
But then United States Steel Corporation Chairman

13

Means,

op.

cit., pp.

^4Steel and Inflation,

71-80,
op.

118-150.

cit., p.

56.

^American Iron and Steel Institute, The Competitive
Challenge to Steel (New York:
1961), pp. 37-42; also 15th
American Assembly, p. 43.
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Roger Blough turned these figures of other people into the
company's own figures when he stated that the company had
found the long term increase since 1940 to be 1.7%

(note he

also said this was considerably below the 2.5% the contract
required,

and also note the other conflicting statement

above

from the same company that productivity ranged from
16
2.5 to 2.9 percent per year).
Thus far the range indicated

by various people is 1.7% to 2.9%.
Another company relies on the figures of the Federal
17
Government, which calculated productivity at 2.6%.
There
are other sources,
the matter.

but these will only serve to complicate

The government has attempted to clarify some of

the problems involved, pointing out that output per man
hour for the economy as a whole can be used as a guide for
national policy on employment price increases which would be
consistent with stable prices only under certain conditions.
These conditions are that physical capital used and its cost
per unit remain constant,

and constant return to capital is

seen as correct with increasing real wages.

The government

16

1962,

News Conference held by Roger Blough on April 12,
New York.
17

A. C. Adams, Chairman Jones & Laughlin Steel, in a
letter to President Kennedy dated September 13, 1961; cites
nothing but the figure appears in Background Statistics Bearing
on the Steel Dispute (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Dept, of Labor
Bulletin No. S-l, October, 1959), p. 10.
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feels these conditions are fairly well met.
The analysis which seemed to be the most thorough was
the one by Means to which the author turned in the last
section.

That analysis found that total employment costs in¬

creased 83% between 1942 and 1953, which Means felt to be the
reason for some of the increase in steel prices during the
time period

(he found in a later section that the price in¬

creases in those years were justified).
his investigation into 1959,

The analyst carries

and finds that an annual in¬

crease in productivity is in the range of 4.2 to 5.2 per cent
19
for the period from 1953 to 1959costs,

prices,

and profits,

When this thesis gets to

these findings will be discussed

more.
It should be noted here though, that where the 1942 to
1953 figures the analyst presented seemed justified,
figures from 1953 to 1959 did not.

the

The total employment

cost increase per ton of steel was calculated to be about
18% for the latter time period, while price increases were
36%.

Labor costs represent about one-third of steel costs,

18

Collective Bargaining in the Basic Steel Industry
(Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Dept, of Labor, 1961), p. 157.

19

Means,

op.

cit.,

pp.

118-150.
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and thus could not nearly have accounted for the price
20
increases during those years.
The range of productivity figures encountered is
now 1.7% by both the companies and an independent person
in reference to the national economy over the last 70 years;
the latter figure is per total factor input,
man hour.
2.1%.

In later years the figure for the economy is

The companies gave other estimates over short and

long run
3.7%.

not output per

(not all mentioned here)

which ranged from 2.5% to

An independent economist gives a range for later

years of 4.2% to 5.2%.

Hence no one seems to agree with any¬

one else in terms which can be analyzed and judged.
1.7% and 2.1% figures for the economy seem correct,

The
but the

problem is finding the correct figure for national policy.
It would seem that in terms of national policy,

the

only figures which could be accepted would be the national
figures.

But in terms of steel management and

union,

it is

doubtful that many settlements from the past would meet the
2.1% standard,

on a total factor input basis.

The companies

refer to settlements which cost much more than this.
The exact figure may not be important in this paper.

20

Ibid.
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but the

concept of productivity is one

justifications
settlements

for price

increases.

of the

company

The union may gain

in excess of national productivity,

companies may be

gaining price

increases

but the

in excess of what

is needed.

Competition

One

of the more

interesting areas

of study in this

paper is the phenomenon of competition in the
This

steel industry.

competition is actually of two distinct types,

and external

(terminology used for convenience).

competition as used here
exists

among the

firms

refers to the

internal

Internal

competition which

in the American steel

industry.

Ex¬

ternal competition thus refers to foreign steel competition
and competition from producers
where

of substitutes

for steel any¬

in the world.
A good deal of evidence exists regarding the

tion

faced by the

steel

competi¬

industry from foreign steel producers

21
and from producers

21

See the

of substitute products.

following:

Steel prices

in

American Iron and Steel Institute,

Foreign Trade Trends, annually; Charting Steel's Progress,
annually; also The Competitive Challenge to Steel, op. cit.;
and J.

1961) .

W.

Ford,

The

Steel

Import Problem

(New York:

Fordham,
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this country seem to be high in relation to foreign steel
prices for one reason or another.
lar reason is unimportant,

At this point the particu¬

but the fact remains that ex¬

ternal competition is severe.
balance of payments problem,

This does not help our
for steel imports are increasing

22
and exports are decreasing.
The external challenge to the steel industry is some¬
what new,

for the American steel industry has been a major

producer for world consumption.

In a short period of time,

our portion of world markets has been cut.

The competition

which exists outside the American steel industry would seem
to be good, but the competitive position in which the in¬
dustry finds itself can be explained more readily by a dis¬
cussion of the internal competition in the

industry.

In the American steel industry non-price competition
seems to exist and few people dispute this.
forts made by companies to advertise,

There are ef¬

to deliver on time,

and to perform many other services for customers.

But non¬

price competition does not do very much to set up a com¬
petitive market in steel because buyers are more
in price.

22

If a price is lowered,

Collective Bargaining,

interested

customers will buy.

op.

cit.,

pp.

167-168.

The
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steel industry is characterized by "price leadership" on
the part of the United States Steel Corporation and "follower23
ship" by almost all other firms in almost all cases.
Administered pricing is another characteristic of
the

industry,

and this concept seems to involve executive

determination of prices which are held constant while demand
changes.

Production is varied to meet demand at an in¬

flexible price.

The market structure of the industry is

such that the companies can keep the prices stable even in
the face of severe drops in demand.
deal of market power.

The firms have a great

The prices in the industry are in¬

flexible downward,

but are flexible upward.
24
pattern which is constantly upward.

They follow a

Another characteristic of the industry is that almost
all prices are identical,
ferentials.

except for minor geographical dif¬

The industry usually moves as one,

firm raises prices all follow.

for when one

Very seldom are prices lowered.

Hence where price competition would appear to be the

23

United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Report on Administered
Prices, No. 1387 (Washington, D.C.), pursuant to S. Res. 57
as extended, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., March 13, 1958, esp.
pp. 74-76.
24J. M. Clark, The Wage-Price Problem (American Bankers
Association, 1960), pp. 23-30.
Clark has called this move¬
ment "ratchet-action."
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type which would be most effective,
If there is no price competition,

it is almost precluded.

very little

is left.

Many explanations were attempted at the Congressional
25
Hearings of 1957
but they were very unconvincing.
The
United States Steel Corporation has admitted through its
26
President in the past
that it set prices in the industry.
The present justification for the method of operation for a
company in the industry is that everyone is meeting the
market price, which is set by a small handful of executives
at United States Steel.

One meets the market price no matter

which way it goes, up or down,
27
or over-capacity.

despite conditions of demand

As price leader United States Steel can not very well
be meeting the market price so that company must justify
its increases on the basis of costs, which is the usual
pattern of answer by the company.
Meeting the competitive price is actually the busi¬
ness concept of remaining competitive,
economic concept of competition.

25
26

27

One writer states that

Report on Administered Prices,
Ibid.,
Ibid.

p.

74.

but is not the

op.

cit.
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nothing in either classical or monopolistic types
tion would necessarily lead to the
28

of competi¬

inflexibility of ad-

ministered prices.
Many officials were questioned at Congressional
Hearings

on the

stances where

steel situation,

companies

but few could remember in¬

other than United States

Steel

29
initiated price
The

increases.

logic behind this method of operation in the

dustry is easily seen.
price

increase

meet a decrease

United States

or decrease;

Steel

all companies will instantly

industry revenue

is

industry has argued that demand is price
of steel,

probable

(this

initiates a

so nothing is gained for any individual

company unless total

case

so that such an increase
is also one

of the

increased.

in revenue

eyes

to lower prices because

in the

individual company's
if no one

does everyone will make money and be happy except,
the general public.

29

op.

perhaps,

In no case will a company go lower on

decrease than United States Steel.

Means,

is not

justifications given for

Hence

it makes no sense

The

inelastic in the

not lowering prices).

28

in¬

cit.,

pp.

26-29.

Report on Administered Prices,

op.

cit.

If the move was an increase,
money if all the prices are
almost like
companies

a monopoly.

everyone

"competitive,"

For example,

prices are

identical.

the price;

this

The

If one wishes

because

there

in this country who make rails,

can make more

are

this

is

only four

and all

to buy rails,

four
one pays

is essentially a monopoly price.30

dangers of price wars

are

such that smaller

%

companies have
The

little

choice

in following in most cases.

cut-throat competition which would emerge would be

disaster for small firms

for the

larger

firms have

the power

to hold out longer.
United States Steel has also given a figure
target rate

of return on investment for which the

supposedly aims.

Pricing is

for a
company

said to be bottomed on the

cept of 8% return on investment over the
:

->

long run,

and it

t

>

appears that overcapacity and fluctuating demand are
upon more

favorably by the

with fluctuating price.
profit,

everyone

or maybe

30

the government.

Ibid.,

p.

74.

looked

industry than stable production

If everyone

is happy,

con

can make

a reasonable

but the general public perhaps,
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The
healthy.
be

state

of competition in the

It is not merely the

fact that prices happen to

identical that is the problem,

way,

why they move

movements are

but how they got that

together to stay that way,

almost always upward.

not make a price
market price.

industry is not

competitive,

and why the

Words on competition do

and neither does meeting the

The question of legitimate prices enters
31

into the picture.
It appears that some
exists

in the

status quo.

steel industry which effectively maintains the
This

follows decides

is difficult to prove,

for himself to follow,

Executives at some
make

sort of an unwritten agreement

the reader

or so they say.

of the Hearings make

feel

like a fool.

thing under quiet control.
will follow a price

since everyone who

statements which

They seem to have every¬

They have

stated that everyone

increase to remain competitive,

even though united States
producer of some products,

Steel may not even be

and that

a leading

it still sets the prices

of those

products.
The

responsibility for price

out into nowhere,

with everyone

■^Defined by Means,

op.

levels seems to drift

trying to meet a competitive

cit.,

pp.

158-60,

return on investment equal to cost of capital

as rate

for firm.

of
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price,

and United States Steel setting the price on the

basis of its costs.

As long as United States Steel can

justify price increases through costs,
prices will keep going up.

it appears that

Followers do not follow any

pattern of being more or less efficient and raising and
not raising prices?

they all raise.

Costs

The costs of the steel companies are a major factor
in the determination of legitimacy in pricing.

Most firms

do not make the data available, which may not be a loss,
since most follow United States Steel and the latter abounds
in public relations material in attempts to justify price
increases.
Most price increases occur after the signing of labor
contracts, which is possibly a company attempt to associate
prices with wages.

This general approach by business firms

caused in good part the concept of the wage-price spiral,
and it is similar to the vicious circle concept.
firms can raise prices and make good profits,

If steel

then the union

should get as much as possible for the workers,

since both
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the wage and price increase will actually be paid for by the
general public.
The American system provides for free collective
bargaining and price determination.

However,

there are op¬

portunities for certain sectors to take advantage of their
privileges.

Union and management in the steel industry can

take the people on the proverbial ride if they are not watched.
The general public must pay the higher prices and suffer from
inflationary tendencies if sectors take advantage of the op¬
portunities which the system offers to those who do not
have the integrity to bear their responsibility to the public
interest.

This is one example of the tremendous dynamics of

our system, where the forces are at play,

turning into some

relationship which may or may not be equitable.
One analysis of costs in the steel industry by Means
studies the movement of the costs from 1942 to 1953,

and then

32
from 1953 to 1959.

The Wholesale Price Index rose 72% be¬

tween 1942 and 1953, while steel prices rose 100%.

Total

33
labor costs rose 83% in the period.

Material costs rose

114% per unit of output between 1942 and 1953,

32

Means,

op.

33Ibid. , pp'.

cit., pp.
78-80.

65-150.

according to
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the study,

and when combined with labor and service costs,

the total increase amounts to almost 100%.
margin increased 100% for the period.

The producer

The author concluded

that for the period from 1942 to 1953, price increases in¬
stituted by the industry were justified.
Total labor costs rose 18% from 1953 to 1959, while
steel prices rose 36%.

The companies argue that costs

which are non-labor tend to increase at the same rate as
the labor cost.
Means.

This is not so after 1953 according to

After 1953,

operating costs increased about 10% as

opposed to 18% for labor costs.
gives as the legitimate figure
1958 is 14%.

The figure the analysis
for the period from 1953 to

The actual rise was 36%.

Means concluded that

the producer margin must have been doubled in the short sixyear period.
Means then turns to an analysis of breakeven points
34
from the 1957 Hearings.
According to the breakeven
analysis.

United States Steel would have broken even in 1953

at 47% of capacity as an operating rate, while in 1959
they would have broken even at little more than 30% of
capacity,

34

as shown by a later analysis from the same expert.

Ibid., pp. 147-48. Analysis by Fred Gardner.
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This iiniriediately indicates that higher profit margins were
operating.
The viewpoint of United States Steel is that for the
period from 1939 to 1956,
costs was 169%,

the rise in material and service

as compared to an increase of 148% in prices.

In the same time period,

employment costs rose 211% while

35
productivity rose 56%.

The study reverts back and forth

to different base years and short term comparisons in much
the same manner that the union study does,
base will change the results.

and changing the

It is amazing that a company

which feels it is incurring so many costs is able to break
even at 30% of capacity; 47% is excellent, but 30% is
phenomenal.
Another study is available, which concentrates mainly
36
on wages in the cost area.
According to this study, prices
increased 178% between 1940 and 1959, while average realized
price per ton increased 207%,

and employment cost per ton

increased 145% for wage employees and 170 to 188% for all
employees

(the two figures are based on the work of two dif¬

ferent people who prepared background papers for the study).

^Steel and Inflation,

op.

36Collective Bargaining,

cit.,

cp.

pp.

114 ff.

cit., pp.

162-164.
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The Government study concludes that employment costs ac¬
count for one-third of the increase in prices between 1940
and 1959.

Material and service costs account for about 45%
• *

of the increased prices,
and materials)

and hence between them they

(labor

account for over 80% of the increases in

prices since material and service costs increased 205% in
/

the period.
These results tend to agree with industry results
and oppose those of Gardiner Means.

Eckstein and Fromm re¬

port that wages and prices were both exceeding legitimate
levels

(as defined above).

They felt that employment costs

had fallen slightly, while material and service costs had
fallen considerably

(this study changed the base year to

1947, which Means condemned).
The data are divergent once again,

as perhaps is to

be expected in such an area of investigation,

but some

sources should receive more weight than others.

This writer

personally favors the analysis by Means, which shows that
price increases were not justified after 1953,
the most complete.

since it is

The others seem inaccurate in comparison.

The information presented here gives only the barest
summary of extensive work carried on by those referenced,
hence may seem abrupt# but that is not the case;
of material stands behind the findings.

and

a good deal
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Prices and Profits

The primary interest in prices of steel products comes
after 1953,

since many prices were rising until that time.

This date marks the approximate end of the war inflations, and
relative price stability set in for two years before a new
inflationary movement set in.
The industry pricing method has been covered,
is called administered prices;
of the matter.

and it

this is merely the mechanics

The industry prices in search of a target

rate of return, which in the case of United States Steel was
stated as eight per cent,

though as of 1959 it appeared to

be closer to sixteen per cent.
One can now see much of the pricing phenomenon in the
industry,

and there can be little doubt that many people are

confused by the complexity of the situation.

One phenomenon

which has not been discussed is the concept of the "area of
discretion," mentioned in the 1957 Hearings.

This refers

to the ability of steel companies to price within a range
which will satisfy most of the companies as well as serve
to lessen somewhat the constant effects of rising prices.
A farmer can not go to the market and get more for his eggs
than the going rate,

but in steel there is an area in which
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such discretion is possible.

Officials

of certain steel

companies have even admitted to the market power which
exists,

stating that steel company officials must exercise

responsibility in setting prices.
all companies will follow,
not follow.
the

This

There

and beyond that point they may

forms the upper

limit of the

lower limit would supposedly be

price which will either cover the
Steel,

interest.

area,

formed by the

while

lowest

costs at United States

or keep everybody happy in the
This

is a point to which

industry.

is the problem in discussing prices

in the public

If a company has a good deal of market power,

this power can obviously be used to the detriment of society.
The

industry did not follow legitimate practices

to 1959,
rate

for profit margins went up,

of return sought by the

much beyond the

companies.

available which shows that wage

from 1953

increases

target

^cme evidence

is

from 1959 to 1962

were matched by productivity gains on an output per man
37
hour basis.

If this

changed since
that price

1959.

increases

is truly the case,

then little has

Perhaps this would lead one
in 1962 were

though we have noted the

to conclude

indeed not justified,

al¬

complexity of such matters.

■^Statement given to President Kennedy on April 11,
1962,

by W.

Duane Evans of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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However,

disturbing evidence

in terms of profits

shows that in 1962 profit levels were
been for some

time.

level of capacity,
its

The

lower than they had

industry was operating at a low

but certainly United States Steel with

low breakeven point should have made good profits.

is one

of the

conflicts

This

in the evidence which tends to in¬

hibit strong conclusions.

to the

Prices in the American steel

industry do not respond

forces of recession either.

In fact,

in steel in the

1958 recession,

prices increased

and hence were

a strong

part of the curious duo of recession and inflation simul¬
taneously.

Other prices

increased that year as

involves a widespread rise

in price

levels.

In another section of the paper
the

inflation

it was mentioned that

steel company officials felt that each cent increase

labor cost brought another cent increase
that total costs

increased two cents.

in other costs,

in
so

A formula is re¬

portedly used by the

industry for quickly calculating amounts

of price

A figure which is double

increases.

estimated cost

is multiplied by a traditional

twenty man hours
which in case

(more

the

figure

recently a 15 hour figure

of a 24 cent increase

industry’s
of

is used),

in labor cost,

leads to
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a predicted price increase of $9.60.

38

It has been shown that other costs increase only 50%
as much as labor costs in recent years,

and other evidence is

available which indicates that it takes only 12.5 man hours
to produce a ton of steel as of 1956.

39

This would indicate

an increase of about $4.50 instead of the $9.60 indicated by
the company method.
Needless to say,

the industry feels it is losing

money without price increases,

and feels that costs are high

40
and profits are low.

This is self-evident in terms of

what we have presented in prior sections.
Gardiner Means found that profits and prices are high.
Eckstein and Fromm find the profit margin to be widening,

and

find that prices have increased considerably in a short span
41
of time in the steel industry.

38

Dirlam, Kaplan and Lanzilotti, Pricing in Big
Business (Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution,
1958), p. 16.
^Louis Lister, Europe1s Coal and Steel Community
(New York:
Twentieth Century Fund, 1960), p. 68.
40

Steel and Inflation,

op.

cit.

^Otto Eckstein and Gary Fromm, Steel and the Postwar
Inflation, Study Paper No. 2 in connection with Hearings on
Employment, Growth, and Price Levels, Washington, D.C.
86th Congress, 1st Session, November 6, 1959.

CHAPTER IV

THE STEEL INDUSTRY AND THE
UNITED STATES ECONOMY

The Cyclical Problem

Steel is a product of such nature that consumers will
seldcm buy it for its own sake;

steel is of little use un¬

less one can do something with it,
refrigerators, homes,
crher structures.

factories,

i.e., build automobiles,

buildings,

bridges,

and

Most of the uses of steel are for con-

s-jsrver and industrial purposes.
to rhe business cycle.

Hence they must be related

There may be other uses which govern

rents right promote either on a constant basis,
tusiraess cycle hits low points,

or when the

the latter as part of public

works spending.
The close ties of the steel industry to the business
cycle j»ean that steel will not be purchased in large
quantities if no one is purchasing the final products which
incorporate steel into their construction. Hence production
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of steel will rise and fall with the business cycle.
This paper has shown some of the characteristics of
the steel industry in the preceding chapter.
rises and falls,

When demand

production rises and falls,

remains constant at best,

but price

or rises slowly over the years.

Hence it can be seen that this relation of steel to the
i

business cycle provided a basis for the industry to keep its
prices steady while allowing production to vary,

and this was

the road chosen by the industry.

years,

In foreign countries,

prices fall during recession

as would be expected,

and the pattern of constantly

rising prices seems unique in this country.

2

The constant

rise in prices will not help the steel industry of this
country to maintain or increase its competitive position
during recession years,
prosperity;

or for that matter,

during years of

the price of foreign steel falls,

cheaper to import in some cases.

and it is

This is not universal be¬

cause the cost of shipping steel can be an important factor

Background Statistics Bearing on the Steel Dispute
(Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Govt. Dept, of Labor, October,
1959), Bulletin No. S-I, p. 22; also Report on Administered
Prices, U.S. Senate No. 1387, March, 1958, pp. 8, 18-22, 23-31.

2

Background Statistics,

op.

cit., p.

35.
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in the final price, which can limit the ability of foreign
producers to compete effectively in this country.

This

disadvantage has not stopped our imports from increasing
yet,

nor has it stopped our exports from decreasing.
Other problems are created by the fluctuation of pro¬

duction in the American steel industry.

When production

falls to low levels and prices remain high,
in the steel industry rises.

unemployment

This causes union grief,

and

has caused in the past a good deal of union effort to force
the companies to provide employee security or job security
benefits.

These benefits cost money, which reduces profits,

and gives the companies another argument to use when attempting
to justify price increases.
prices bring profits back up,

On the other hand,

the higher

and gives the union an inviting

target for further demands when negotiations take place.
The heavy fixed costs of the industry also do not
diminish during recessions.

Per unit fixed cost will

obviously increase when fewer units are produced,

and this

again causes a problem in terms of profits or justification
for increasing prices.

Cost patterns in the steel industry

change during recession years, with per unit employment
costs rising sharply,

although material costs rise little
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if at all.

The increase of per unit employment costs

results from the inability of the industry to cut as many
workers from its payroll as would be needed to maintain the
cost at a steady level.

some of the employees are non¬

production workers who can not be released readily.
The relation of these problems to productivity has
already been shown,

for the industry is not efficient until

high levels of capacity utilization are achieved,

and

capacity utilization can influence short term productivity
rates.

Profits are likewise tied to rate of capacity utiliza

tion.

The Facility Problem

The problem of industry capacity is another in¬
teresting aspect of relation here.
excess capacity in the industry,
some time.

There is a good deal of

and there has been for

The problem is further complicated by the high

average age of many of the American facilities, which are
not as efficient as modern facilities.

The destruction of

^Collective Bargaining in the Basic Steel Industry
(Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Govt. Dept, of Labor, 1961), p. 163.
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foreign steel facilities during World War II resulted in
many new and modern plants during reconstruction after the
war*

This has been one more factor which has worked to the

disadvantage of the American steel industry.
To combat the advantage of the foreign producers,
much of the American steel plant must be modernized.

This

will only serve to add to the capacity of the industry.
But the demand for steel is such that this capacity can not
be utilized under present conditions.

The damage has al¬

ready been done for imports are higher,

exports are lower,

other materials are competing with steel in many areas where
steel was formerly the sole or major material supplier,

and

hence the average rate of capacity will fall even more when
capacity is added, unless new markets are developed,
markets are regained.
dustry in this area.
but as seen here,

High prices do not help the steel in¬
The need for the new capacity is clear,

the problem is two-sided,

ment of the industry is also clear.
added;

or old

and the predica¬

The capacity should be

it would certainly be needed in event of war, which

constantly threatens us,

and modern capacity would enable

quicker retaliation and more sustained long term efforts if
needed.

The industry is criticized for the excess capacity
'/
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until it is needed,
crease.

then the demands upon the industry in¬

Perhaps this is an unjust criticism,

the other actions of the industry lead to it,

but some of
and these

actions are not always approved.
The position which has been taken by the Federal
Government in Congressional Hearings is one of confusion
over the state of price patterns during recessions,

and de¬

bate over the need to maintain prices while production
drops.

It would seem that the Government would like to see

production steady at a relatively high rate of operation
with prices fluctuating and more opportunity for the industry
4
to regain its markets and compete effectively.
This would
perhaps help to solve some of the problems set out above,
and there can be no doubt that those problems assume major
proportions in the relation of steel to the public interest
and the economy.

The Impact of Steel On The Economy

The exact importance of steel in the economy may seem
self-evident,

but the question has been debated for some time

^Report on Administered Prices,
pages for full development of theme.

op.

cit.,

entire 74
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now,

with the companies arguing that steel is relatively un¬

important in terms of some of our problems in this country.
Government studies conflict in their estimation of the im¬
portance of steel,

and some of the economists are split.

One economist,

Jules Backman,

has done some work on
5

the importance of steel prices in the consumer price index.
This work tends to support the company argument,
work was done for the company argument;
for United States Steel,
publications,

and the

Backman does work

and this piece appears in their

although originally prepared for the 1957

Hearings to which the footnotes have referred.
His findings are that the major items in the index
which would be affected by a price increase account for
about 12% of the weight of the total index.

The cost of

steel as a per cent of list price of some of the items on
the index varies from 4% to 10%,
item chosen.

depending on the particular

Backman points out that the United States Com¬

missioner of Labor Statistics had commented once that the
1956 increase in steel prices would have had a negligible

5

Jules Backman, "The Importance of Steel Prices
in the Consumer Price Index," in Steel and Inflation, Fact
vs. Fiction (New York:
United States Steel Corporation,
1958), pp. 75-81 fo£ all of Backman's findings.
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effect on the index,

but the Commissioner subsequently

pointed out in a letter to Senator Kefauver

(deceased)

in

6
1957 that the effect would be delayed but would be definite.
Thus it would appear that steel does have some effect on
the index,

though the extent is debatable;

the Commissioner

declined to estimate the effect on the index by the 1956
price increase.

The economist later points out through

analysis that changes in steel prices do not show any clearcut relationship to changes in the index.
correct,

This is seemingly

but the Wholesale Price Index would seem to be a

better choice for comparison of changes in steel prices and
changes in index prices?

this was also discussed,

but the

data used ended in 1956, while the period in which interest
is centered here ends in 1959.
for the latter index.

The conclusions were similar

The economist concluded that steel

prices do not determine the price levels of the CPI or the
WPI,

though they may be important in some sectors of the

economy.
The above results conflict sharply with the results

^Letter to Senator Estes Kefauver from Ewan Clague,
dated September 25, 1957, in Hearings on Administered Prices,
United States Senate, part 3, Appendix A, pp. 1053-54? full
reference in final bibliography.
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of a later Government study.

This later study found steel

prices profoundly influenced the price level of the WPI over
the period from 1949 to 1959:
If steel prices had behaved like other industrial
prices the total wholesale price index would have
risen by 40 percent less over the last decade and
less by 52 percent since 1953.
Finished-goods
prices would have risen less by 23 and 38 percent,
respectively. 8
This is related to the position of steel in the economy,
and steel and inflation,

though perhaps the reason for any

inflationary forces the steel industry exerts is not clear
at this point;

that will be discussed shortly.

point out, however,

It does

that steel is thought by some to have a

definite effect on the economy and the price levels in this
country.
Another study points out that the influence exerted
on steel prices is minor in its effects on three indices,
but has an effect on the WPI
the CPI,

(the three other indices are

GNP Implicit Price Deflator,

and the Personal Con¬

sumption Expenditures Implicit Price Deflator)

7

of finished

Otto Eckstein and Gary Fromm, Steel and the Postwar Inflation, in connection with 1959 Hearings on Employ
ment. Growth, and Price Levels, Joint Economic Committee;
full reference in final bibliography.
8Ibid..

pp.

6-14,

34.
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goods.
Steel has been estimated to constitute between 2.5%
and 4.7% of the economy,

depending on what measure is chosen

for comparison purposes.
total corporate sales,

Steel sales in 1955 were 2.5% of

3.6% of the GNP in that year,

of the GNP less services.^
which could be made,

and 4.7%

(There are other comparisons

such as total assets,

so that one

should not place too much emphasis on any given set of
figures someone publishes.)

The importance of steel in the

CPI has been shown to be about 12% (above),
of the WPI.

and about 5.8%

This led the company analyst to conclude that

11
steel is not very important as stated above.
Another study concerned with the impact of steel
strikes upon the economy concluded that the impact is usually
not as severe as people believe, when viewed over a time
period which includes a period before and after the actual

12
strike.

The conclusion is based upon analysis of operating

Collective Bargaining,
full presentation.
10Backman,

cit.,

pp.

179-96 for

in Steel and Inflation,

op.

cit., p.

11Ibid., pp.

75-81,

105.

100-105.

•^Collective Bargaining,
presentation.

op.

op.

cit., pp.

31-49 for full

-58-

levei before and after any given strike in the steel in¬
dustry,

and upon analysis of inventory levels of raw steel,

seni-finished goods,

and finished goods.

It is shown that

the industry operates at higher levels before and after the
strike,

and that inventory levels usually absorb the shock

of the strike to the point where little loss of production
cr goods on the market results.

Even in the 116 day steel

strike of 1959 the economy was shown to have suffered little
free shortage of goods.

This is seen in the study as a

call for less government intervention.

It should be pointed

out that the inventory strike hedge accumulation which takes
place before a strike is costly,
be tied up in the
spread,

inventory,

in that some funds have to

and if the strike hedge is wide¬

this can assume the proportions of a major economic

waste. One might think this is unimportant at this time for
the union and the firms are at a point of better relations
where strikes may be averted in the future,

but the fact is

that there have been five major strikes in the steel industry
since unionism became widespread in steel.
been unionized since the late

'thirties,

have occurred between 1946 and 1959.

The industry has

and the five strikes

This is one of the

reasons for the concern of the public and the Government
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over the steel industry.
The study of the impact of steel strikes also points
out that the pressures upon the parties to settle become
substantially irresistible when the strikes begin to reach
critical proportions,
about settlement.

and these pressures usually bring

The study further concludes that there

have been costs to the parties during strikes such as loss
of income to workers,

and costs of shutdown and startup to

the steel firms, but the final conclusion states that steel
strikes have not caused irreparable damage to the economy.
The degree to which steel prices and wages lead the
levels of prices and wages in the country is an area of
dispute.

The

other prices,

firms argue that steel prices do not lead
and this paper has shown that an economist feels

steel prices are relatively unimportant in the economy,
having studied the matter.
agrees with that viewpoint.

after

Another study was shown which
Another economist has shown

that steel prices do lag behind other prices both in periods
of rising prices and declining prices.

The pattern is that

other prices tend to move in a given direction and then re¬
verse, while steel prices move more slowly but continue to
surpass the others shortly after they reverse.

In the case
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of increases,

the

steel prices continue

to rise

long after

other prices peak off and return to a slowly increasing
13
pattern.
An outline of past history in steel labor-management
negotiations tends

to develop a feeling in the mind of this

writer that patterns
steel industry,
mobile

in settlements are

which has occurred,

settlements between the

but also by the

three

and the United Automobile Workers,

led not only by the

largest manufacturers

which has occurred more

14
frequently.
Other settlements may influence
steel settlements

somewhat.

the pattern of

It is difficult for the public

to assess this matter carefully,

because

given in the press to major bargains,
person to actually follow all

auto¬

of the coverage

and the

settlements.

inability of a

Hence

it may be

that the major settlements have greater influence

on public

opinions.

13
Interest
63,

66,

Gardiner Means,
(New York:

67,
14

231-307.

69,

Pricing Power and the Public

Harper & Brothers,

and 71,

1962),

pp.

54,

60,

charts and text.

Collective Bargaining,

op.

cit.#
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The

Steel

Industry and Inflation

Several types of inflation have been recognized by
most economists.
type

These

of inflation?

push inflation?

are

the

Classical demand-pull monetary

the wage-push inflation,

and administrative

and the cost-

inflation.

These may be

widespread or sectoral.
Classical demand-pull monetary inflation results
from an excess of total monetary demand,
in the entire economy,
which are available

relative to the

in a sector or

amount of goods

or which the economy can produce within

a short period of time,

to satisfy the

demand.

of the economy to expand quickly might be
short run by a shortage

The

capacity

limited in the

of labor or materials,

which would

add to the demand problem until such a bottleneck was removed.
It might be

that few resources

economy could not be
the

from other sectors of the

shifted to the bottleneck sector.

demand is met the pressures on prices will abate,

this time
increase

the price
of various

inflation is

but by

level will have been pulled up by the
individual prices due

of goods and the money available
type of

Once

to the

for purchasing them.

sometimes characterized as

money chasing too few goods,"

shortage
This

"too much

and it refers to the

fact that
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when money is abundant and goods are scarce, prices rise.
The problem of price flexibility also should be dis¬
cussed.

It has been shown that steel prices are flexible

upward, but relatively inflexible downward.
exceeds demand prices should fall,

'Where supply

in opposition to the

situation where demand exceeds supply and prices are pulled
upward.

In the steel industry,

production is allowed to

fluctuate in relation to demand so that when demand falls,
production falls,

and excess capacity takes up the excess

supply in the short run,

and in the case of the steel in¬

dustry this is extended into the long run.

In traditional

theory price would fluctuate with supply and demand inter¬
actions,

and output would come at the most efficient point.

A firm with excess capacity would have higher costs but would
not be able to price any higher than the economically com¬
petitive price,

and hence would be forced to eliminate excess

capacity or be eliminated from the industry.
In classical inflation the demand schedule shifts
upward to the right.

In a push type inflation, where

prices are said to be pushed up by some type of costs,
than pulled up by demand,
curve upward to the left.

rather

the shift comes in the supply
What effect this has on quantity

sold depends upon the shape of the demand curve,

but the
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price will have to be higher under push type influences
before the supplier will sell or supply more,

either because

costs are higher or because profits are higher

(which is

resultant in what is called administrative inflation).
(The basic difference is between the Classical,
other three types recognized here.)

and the

In the push-type cases,

quantity must fall somewhat if demand is less than perfectly
inelastic or does not shift.
However, where supply interacts with a given demand
schedule in traditional theory,

in the case of the modern

steel industry the supply or production is deliberately
limited to the quantity demanded with a given demand schedule
in order to maintain the price.

The supply curve,

then,

shifts upward to the left to meet any given quantity
demanded,

in all cases but the Classical inflation, when

discussing the steel industry.

Supply almost never shifts

downward to the right because prices almost never fall.
Prices can be increased in steel because the demand is rela¬
tively inelastic.

If no substitutes exist

(as with rails),

the full prior quantity demanded will continue unless it be¬
comes unprofitable to buy steel,

and thus prices could go

even higher as the supply curve shifts upward to the left
into equilibrium with a perfectly inelastic demand schedule
at a higher price.

;

'

:

^

"

“64“

Market power helps the companies keep the prices up
though in some areas foreign competition and other materials
may have some limiting effect.

It works through the supply

curve, but this does not say where the revenue goes.
go to increased costs or to profit.
for when demand goes up,
when prices fall,

It may

It is a vicious cycle

prices are likely to go up;

but

production is limited.

The increase of prices in steel may constitute
sectoral inflation,

but the usual type of inflation which

worries the public is the type where many prices increase
until the point is reached where price levels generally
are

increased.

Inflation is then a widespread phenomenon.

According to one analysis above,

the steel industry

increased prices altogether too much in the 1953-1959 period.
Not only did wages increase substantially,
increased.

but profits also

The analysis pointed out that while steel of¬

ficials were seeking an eight per cent return on investment,
they were getting one more in the neighborhood of sixteen
15
per cent.
Hence the industry contributed to the new push-

15

Means, Pricing Power, op. cit., p. 146, in relation
to United States Steel, where they would have made 8% in
1953, they would have made 16% at the same rate of operation
in 1959.
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type inflation more than needed,

which is supported by the

analysis of Eckstein and Fromm which stated that price
levels would have risen much less than they actually did,
if steel prices had behaved in a manner similar to all other
16

prices.
Some economists still do not agree with the concept
of the push type of inflation, while some do.
push type back to demand pull.

Actually the push type can

contribute to a pull type inflation,
actually income that can be spent,
which could be spent.

Some trace the

in that wages are

and profits are income

Undoubtedly both push and pull type

forces were at work in the 1955-1957 period,

but not to

the extent,

that was the

in the case of pull type forces,

case from 1940-1953 in inflationary periods during those
years.

In any event, pull type forces would not seem to

have been very important in the 1958 recession, where infla¬
tion also occurred.

Steel prices were increased in 1958.

Actually steel prices rose over fifty dollars per ton as an
average in the period from 1953 to 1958.

The average price

of steel per ton at the time was only somewhere around

16

Steel and the Postwar Inflation, op. cit., pp. 6-14,
34; if steel prices had risen a percentage-wise total similar
to the rise in other prices.
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one-hundred and seventy dollars per ton

(1958),

although it

is difficult to locate the exact figure.
The companies argue that rising prices are a result
of inflation,

not a cause of inflation, which is true under

Classical inflation.

It is not true that under push or ad¬

ministrative inflation rising prices are a result — they are
the cause.

The companies do not choose to recognize this,

nor do they choose to recognize administrative inflation.
They do choose to accuse the union of causing push type in¬
flation, which would seem to contradict their argument that
rising prices are a result of inflation.
Eckstein and Fromm show that the causes of the post¬
war inflation are from several main sectors of the economy,
namely cost of services,

cost of government,

cost of machinery,
17
and cost of industrial and commercial construction.
They
show that in the 1955 to 1958 period,

steel prices, which

represent eight per cent of the Wholesale Price Index,
counted for twenty-two per cent of the rise
the index.

ac¬

in the level of

(The steel company economist had stated that

steel prices accounted for less than six per cent of the WPI.)
The eight per cent figure is a result of items which can

17

Ibid.,

p.

3.
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definitely be attributed to steel,
analysis,

but using input-output

the authors conclude that the total weight of

steel in the WPI is 10.9%, which is considerably higher than
the industry economist found.

The input-output technique

facilitates analysis of sales and purchases to and from each
industry in the economy,

and thus permits more careful estima¬

tion of the true effect of steel in the economy.

The analysis

performed by the authors assumed that price increases in steel
were neither absorbed by user industries,
an additional markup on cost,
be expected to happen.

nor passed on with

both of which might actually

This assumption may tend to bias

the results against the favor of the industry.
The authors comment on the work of the economist con¬
nected with the steel company

(United States Steel),

stating

that the CPI is a particularly bad index to choose for
this type of work,

though they point out that the WPI,

which they used, excludes services,

retail trade,

and con¬

struction, making steel loom larger than it would in GNP.
Another study has shown that other than the WPI,
18
the effects of steel are minor

•^Collective Bargaining,

(cited above p.

op.

cit.,

pp.

56).

176-96.

The
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author found far lower results than Eckstein and Fromm,

and

criticizes their approach on some of the limitations that
have been pointed out above.

In particular,

that author

points out that increased prices may be partially the result
of inflation in other industries,

such as material suppliers

and freight services.
The author continues to discuss inflation,
three notions which are useful;

naming

inflation may come in final

product prices where intermediate products are used up

(here

he believes the GNP deflator is the most comprehensive index
and should be used);

inflation may occur in consumer prices

(in which case the CPI or the Personal Consumption Expenditures
deflator would be most appropriate);
at the primary market level

or inflation may occur

(in which case the finished

goods WPI is the best to use).
Final product prices are a result of cost of value
added before steel
in steel,

(materials,

services),

and after the steel production

during production
(user industries).

Steel industry responsibility is limited to the cost of value
added while processing in the steel stages,

according to the

author, who is using national income accounting concepts.
The cost of value added in an industry for present
purpose consists of wages,

profits,

depreciation,

and indirect
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business taxes.
Means,

The work of Eckstein and Fromm,

the results of the Congressional Hearings,

of the work of the companies,

Gardiner
and some

shows that wages and prices

were operating factors in the inflation of 1955-1958.
Perhaps inadequate depreciation was also present.

Pro¬

ductivity would also seem to be related here in terms of
short run effects.
The analysis continues to discuss other areas,

and

these are too detailed to discuss fully at this point, but
the conclusions are that the Eckstein and Fromm figure of
23% for the inflationary extent of steel prices can be
reduced to 15% because of inflation in other sectors before
\

and after steel production,
index is accepted as valid.
the extent is much less

given that the WPI finished goods
If other indices are accepted

(as pointed out above).

Steel price

increases will caa se less than one per cent increase in the
price level even given a 100% increase in steel prices,
when relating this to the cost of capital facilities in the
long run;

that is another finding.

increases over a period of time,
steel prices are increased,
not adverse.

Firms may collect cost

and increase prices when

given demand conditions that are

In conclusion the author found that the infla¬

tionary effect of steel prices in the postwar period has
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bee n modest,

as the companies contend,

nected with them finds.

and an economist con¬

The author's study is enclosed in

a larger study

(composed of twelve sub-studies) which tends
19
to favor steel.
Eckstein and Fromm tend to indict steel
somewhat in agreement with Gardiner Means and the Report of
the 1957-58 Congressional Hearings.

The Eckstein and Fromm

study was connected with the 1959 Congressional study by
■

the Joint Economic Committee on Employment,
Price Levels,

Growth,

and

and that set of Hearings and studies found

steel to be one important cause of the postwar inflation,
along with cause by inflation of service prices, and in20
stability of output in the economy.
The 15th American
Assembly found that both wages and prices were important in
causing inflation in the postwar period.

The demand factor

was also present in the period.
Few sources thus give one reason for the postwar in¬
flation,

but it is apparent that several of them feel steel

19

Ibid.
The study was directed by Professor Livernash of Harvard University, and several people from Govern¬
ment, business, and universities participated; see the
preface of the study.
20

Full reference in final bibliography.

71-

-

is definitely a contributing factor.
that the union would find the
itself.

It would be expected

companies at fault,

and not

It would also be expected that the companies would

find anyone and everyone but themselves at fault.
would be expected that the economist connected
publication)

with the

find that the

company

strong,

independent economist findings.
for economists

making a study.
Livernash,
may have

be against the

or else he would

This has

of Government or
its problems

sometimes tend to favor one

Backman is in favor of the

who directed the

some

leanings in that direction.

services,

and

Means

seems to

along with the union,

accused of

and other sectors

and other companies and unions which played

But causing inflation is definitely not in the

public interest,

and some

burden of proof on the
do as

companies,

industry.

causing inflation,

a part.

side before

Collective Bargaining study,

It seems that steel has reason to be

such as

would

Hence the validity of these arguments

will not be given as much weight as that

too,

(only through

(United States Steel)

company argument was

not have a commission.

And it

it pleases,

of the

findings

leave a heavy

industry that if left alone to

it will act within the public interest.
'/

The results which have been seen must be viewed in light of
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the intense scrutiny which the

industry has undergone.

What might have happened without such scrutiny can only
be left to the imagination.

CHAPTER V

THE STEEL INDUSTRY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

General Considerations

The purpose of this thesis is to promote understanding.
This has to do with the economy,
interest,

the steel industry,

social control of business,

the public

the steel union,

and

the part that these play in the total American system.
Obviously no single work can accomplish such an objective
fully,

but as the late President John F. Kennedy once said,

quoting from an ancient proverb,

one must take the many in¬

dividual steps to complete a thousand mile journey.
case of steel is indeed such a journey,
been taken in the past,

The

and many steps have

but many more will be taken in the

future.
The steel industry presents a challenge to the American
people,

not only as an individual problem, but as a repre¬

sentative of a larger problem of economic concentration and
its place in society,
advantages.

its power and its advantages or dis¬

There are many related problems,
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such as
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automation,
force,

growth of unionism as a political and economic

the questions and problems arising from economic

freedom,

the relation between forces in our society and the

objectives of the society as a system,

and,

of course,

the

many problems involved in the frameworks of these larger
problems.

This chapter represents an attempt by the writer

to set forth some views on these matters based on the
findings of the study and the framework set out in the first
two chapters of the thesis.
When focusing on a specific problem,

such as an in¬

crease in the price of steel products at a given time,

one

may be prone to lose perspective in terms of long range
processes.

This is even more likely when the problem is

highly controversial and difficult to grasp because of un¬
certain standards against which to evaluate rapidly proceeding
events of great import in the long run.
In the American system of Democracy,
representative government,

free enterprise,

and partisan politics as well as

bi-partisan Constitutional objectives and guidance,
must necessarily be many conflicts.

there

The multiple objectives

of our system must be seen in relation to the multiple ob¬
jectives of its parts,

from the major institutional components
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of our society to the millions of individuals within it.
This must take place without full understanding of
these systems,
them,

legal,

for man does not fully understand any of

economic,

or human.

The probability of uni¬

versal understanding at present is low.

Perhaps this is both

an advantage and a disadvantage in that it presents a chal¬
lenge to the capabilities of all these systems, while in
many cases leading to complacency over the wondrous func¬
tioning of the incomprehensible systems such as the economic
system.

"Thus far they have worked!

Why bother?" might be

one way to state the feeling of complacency.
The cold reality of the situation is that it is easy
to become involved in one's own problems to the point where
there is little time for other matters,
and desire are present.

even if the challenge

The limitations of the finite mind

are such that no one can make decisions for everyone,

though

someone gets the job.
The assassination of the late President John Kennedy
points to the need for more complete understanding of one
system,

the human system.

Such tragedies are part of life,

possibly unavoidable and unpredictable at present,
one would ever know whether such events are
through complacency^

but no

irrevocable

Man would never have discovered America
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with complacency.
There is no doubt that the systems continue,

but sane

systems such as the orbital patterns of the planets may
never be changed, while sane others such as the economic
system may be changed;

ours is not the only economic system,

nor is it the first or last.
The interplay of forces within our society leads to
conflicts which challenge complacency somewhat.

These con¬

flicts lead to debate in terms of interests and objectives,
then to decisions and implementation of the decisions, which
may be to modify the existing systems or the relationships
existing between the parts of the total system.
the beauty of the American way of life.
moments of heartache, hatred,

This is

Though it has

confusion and despair,

the

challenges of time and history which constantly manifest
themselves in concrete events lead to critical intelligence
and evaluation of the progress of mankind on a series of
paths,

in terms of human values and objectives.
This will not change as long as the strength of the

human character does not ebb.

Our citizens did not fight

so long in time of war to have this all die.

When the

<±>jectives of one group are in conflict with those of all

-77-

roen,

it is time for a change.
The change which confronts the American people in the

problem in this thesis will obviously be slow;
are part of the total system,
interests,

the parties

they are powerful,

and work to implement those interests.

change will ccxne,

have
But the

just as the Sherman Act of 1890 came when

society would no longer contend with monopoly power.

The

magnitude of the change is not certain but its inevitability
is certain.

The

foundation is under construction now in

Congressional Hearings and factfinding,
partments of many types.

and in Executive de¬

Conflict and forces are present,

and the debate in terms of interests, values,

and objectives

of the system is in progress.
Man makes many of his own problems which he must
solve or live with if they can not be solved.

The steel in¬

dustry must resolve itself to the consequences of its actions.
The damage already done,
can never be restored.

no matter what the extent, perhaps
But this damage must be seen as

minor compared to the gains derived from the learning process
of men through experience,
resultant system.
this world;

and the eventual nature of the

Democracy of sustained nature is new to

it was a long time coming,

and perhaps man has

78-

-

learned enough to sustain it.

Carthage had its Roman Empire,

and today we have our Russian based Communist Empire in
opposition to Democracy.
Now it is possible to see the magnitude of some of
the problems which confront us.
Same would argue the point,
that group.

Is steel such a problem?

but few historians would be in

Steel is a single representative.

is that the case,

but many,

Not only

if not all of our problems,

can be analyzed in terms of a general framework of opposing
forces interacting with each other either directly or through
intermediaries.

Take Freudian analysis, with the interplay

of the id and the superego through the ego;
of Russia and the United States,

the interaction

or more generally,

freedom

and captivity or self-determination and state determination
through science and values;
government.

or steel and the public through

VJhile the examples are divergent,

basic patterns which can be perceived,

there are

that shape the destiny

of man.
If steel is one problem,
of the same basic nature.

there are a thousand others

They are all related,

for they

must all be decided within the framework of our values and
objectives.
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It is possible to understand now the ways in which
the problems of society become controlled,

and what J. M.

Clark meant when he said that social control of business
comes not only through Federal action.

It is not possible

to fool all of the people all of the time,
Lincoln once said.

as President

The problems are essentially timeless

because of the nature of the people who have problems.
Though they learn through the years,

it may be that basic

elements of human nature do not change;

personality and

intellect are separate parts of the person,

physical and

social environment are separate parts of environment,
together these four elements lead to behavior.

and

This is why

we must say that perhaps man has learned enough to sustain
Democracy.

The Steel Industry

The specific incident of April,
the forces at work in society,

1962 brought to light

and the forces of the steel

industry were deemed to be against the public interest.
it is possible to understand what President Kennedy meant
when he said that this country was asking its people to

Now
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sacrifice,

and that four men had died in Viet Nam.

it is political,

it is something to think about.

Although
Man does

not have the historical justification to avoid thinking
about it.
In light of the economic sections of this thesis,
author does not feel these words to be too harsh.
pile up in volume after volume,

the

The facts

and many people are convinced

that the steel industry is not acting in the public interest.
One might infer that perhaps things are different now,

but

the last price increase came in 1963 after an attempt in
1962,

all after a series of increases in a six year period

from 1953 to 1959 which amounted to a 40 to 50 per cent in¬
crease in the price of steel.
factors were responsible,

Perhaps labor and other

but in 1962 labor restrained

itself, where steel did not.
Whether the 1962 price increase would have started a
new wage-price spiral is uncertain,
not have helped avoid one.

but certainly it would

The Kennedy Administration had

been committed to certain objectives,
stability and economic growth.

including price

The steel price increase

would perhaps have hindered these objectives, which are im¬
portant in our society at the present time when we are
/
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competing for survival with our adversaries, when unemploy¬
ment hovers near six percent of the work force,

and generally

when the government needs support rather than opposition in
the form the industry posed.

A line must be drawn somewhere

on what is partisan and what is not.
The specific effects of the price increase should
not even assume major proportions in this analysis.

The in¬

dustry has made so many problems for itself and the country
through its past history frcm the days of Judge Gary to the
present that people have a right to get some action to pre¬
vent the industry from creating turmoil when it is unneeded.
Surely the position of the Kennedy Administration would have
suffered in relation to business and labor,
general public,

if nothing had been done;

said this himself.

and perhaps the

President Kennedy

The matter is not minor.

The industry had moved so far ahead in the period
from 1953 to 1958 that United States Steel would have broken
even at close to 30% of capacity in that year,
price increase in the series.

after the final

It is difficult to see why the

steel industry should deserve to maintain such high levels
of profit.

If labor costs had cut the profit margin some¬

what perhaps this is good for the margin was high in 1958.
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Gar dner's breakeven analysis. Means'
Fromm's analysis,

analysis,

the 1957-58 Hearings,

Eckstein and

and seme of the other

Hearings all tend to support the general thesis that steel
is simply too powerful,

and its prices simply too high.

These sources carry a good deal of weight,

for the

companies and their economist can be expected to defend the
company side.

Only one other major study of any scope sub¬

stantially supports the arguments of the industry,

and this

was prepared under a Republican Administration and directed
by conservative economist E. R. Livernash.

The relative im¬

portance of these studies is difficult to judge.
Other factors relate here,

such as the import-export

problem in steel,

and its competitive position in terms of

other materials.

The balance of payments problem and the

possible effect steel may have had on it are other factors.
There is little evidence on this point,
of the 1959 Hearings on Employment,

save one finding

Growth,

and Price Levels

that tends to minimize the effects of the competitive position
of steel on balance of payments

(see staff report summary

1
in first part of report).

■^1959 Hearings; full reference in final bibliography,
see the first section which presents summaries of chapters
and findings.
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One of the problems of steel industry practices is
the fact that the consumer is not allowed to share in the
gains of efficiency and technology.
the primary aims of society.

This should be one of

Means points out that as the

nature of the economic system in this country changed,
problem of legitimacy arose,

the

and the traditional wisdom of

profit maximization does not fulfill social objectives.
companies recognize that;

executives state they seek not

maximum profits in the short or long run,
reasonable profits.

The

but rather seek

Other executives point out that they

must exercise responsibility in pricing.
When a firm is earning more on investment than the
cost of capital in the market,
damaged in four ways,
here.

the public interest can be

some of which have not been discussed

Means points out that the suppliers of capital are

earning a high return on their investments as a result of
market power rather than risk;

also high prices reduce use

of the product in favor of substitutes;
return will reduce capital expenditures,

thirdly,

increased

since return must

be higher before investment will be undertaken;

and finally,

the high profits will leave an inviting target for labor to

2
seek.

^Gardiner Means, Pricing Power and the Public Interest
(New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1962), pp. 158-60.
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Means also details at length a plan for beginning
to bring the steel industry into line with the public in¬
terest,

so that normal activities of industry officials and

firms will not stray from the bounds of the public interest.

3

Basically the plan involves defining the nature of the
economic operation in the steel industry, which he calls
Administrative Competition.
ministered prices,
motion.

It is characterized by ad¬

the flow principle of production,

and pro¬

The flow principle refers to equating production

and demand at an inflexible price.
Means believes that the two alternative creeds open
to the corporation are unsatisfactory
responsibility),

(profit or social

and devotes the remainder of his study to a

third alternative, based on new bonus plans for economic
performance rather than profits.

He states that most of the

power the executives seek is not tied to profits;
bonus is.

only the

He also proposes an Economic Performance Act,

based on the logic of the Collective Enterprise which is
engaged in Administrative Competition.

The act would in¬

clude special tax rates if return approximates cost of
capital;

perhaps only 100 firms would be under the act due

3Ibid., pp.

163-321.
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to their characteristics.

4

Other approaches to the problem are

few in number.

One possibility is to do nothing in the hope
pull

that steel will

itself into line with the public interest.

This has

not had results in the past which tend to offer support for
the approach.
A second approach is antitrust legislation and Supreme
Court decisions on individual cases.

This approach is not

the best but is part of the present approach.
very effective

It is not

in specific instances because cases may take

up to ten years to completely finish once

started,

and the

cost can run to half of a million dollars or more.
approach is not generally effective
due

to the

The

over the entire area,

specific nature of each case.

with their practices until discovered.

Others continue
Even the

firms under

trial may continue with their actions till convicted.
The nature
also not conducive
vagueness,

of the existing antitrust legislation is
to effectiveness due

and scope

of the Supreme

of the

legislation.

to the poor wording,
And the membership

Court at any given time may determine

the

4
Only certain types of firms would be permitted to enter
into this arrangement; some would be compelled, while others
might have to prove, their nature was such that they fit the
classification.
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types of decisions handed down,

which is another factor

determining antitrust effectiveness,

and one which hindered

effectiveness for some time until the mid-'thirties.
One phase

of the present approach to social control

is Presidential power which has been exercised at various
times.

In relation to the

steel industry,

past instances

/

of Presidential power have come

in 1952 and 1962.

President Truman attempted to seize

the

tempts at settlement of negotiations.

industry after at¬
In 1962 President

Kennedy attempted to bring pressures to bear on the
industry from all quarters
public opinion.

There were

that increased prices

In 1952

steel

of the Government as well as
also economic threats to companies

for the Government buys a good deal of

steel.
Even though the usually considered methods of social
control are varied,
of some

they are dependent upon public policy

sort toward the power of concentrated industries.

Public policy over long term periods depends upon public
knowledge and understanding of unionism,
Government,
detailed.
not high,

concentration,

and

though this understanding need not be completely
The probability of such complete knowledge

is

but the probability of understanding on the part

of all people

of the effects of concentration and wage-price
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spirals is high,

for many of our citizens have lived with

these problems.
One of the biggest factors which does not hold in
the favor of the industry in this case is that there seems
to be a conscious attempt to avoid working in the public in¬
terest, which shows up in actions and characteristics,

while

generous lip-service and propaganda of various sorts emanates
from officials and public relations departments.

Some of

this material has been examined in connection with this
study,

and is extremely narrow in point of view — the in¬

dustry point of view.
In addition,

the ethical connotations of the 1962

incident may be questionable for it seemed that the industry
merely sat back and let the Government and the union commit
5
themselves, and then turned around to increase prices.
The
major steel industry efforts toward working in the public in¬
terest seem to be verbal,
industry,

and the concrete actions of the

such as the increase in prices and profits during

the 1953-58 period,

and the odd methods and arrangements of

5
Grant McConnell, Steel and the Presidency, 1962 (New
York:
Norton, 1963), contains an interesting speculative
discussion, though the author claims it is based upon
conversations with those who were close to the actions of
the time.
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competition among American steel firms seem to point to the
need for still more Government inquiries and intervention,
still more public opinion,

and other attempts at social con

trol.
It is useless to recount all of the thesis in the
interpretation of the findings because the many individual
problems which have been discussed
depreciation)

(productivity,

costs,

could be related at length without gain in

clarity and achievement.

The important thing is to recog¬

nize the many problem areas for future study and discussion
as history progresses.

It is believed that this has been

accomplished.

Summary of Thesis

The public interest is many-faceted and represents
not only individuals but also systems which are part of the
total American system.

It deals with the relationships

existing between these parts as well as with them in¬
dividually.

It is concerned with values and objectives of
1

/

,

the system which are multiple m nature.
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The need for social control of business or labor
flows from the nature of the American way of life,

and these

specific parts of the total system are representatives
rather than isolated cases,

i.e.,

society must control not

only business but all its parts in some manner.

The nature

of the corporation in modern days of concentration leads to
power which may be used for good or evil.

To trust the use

of this power to the social responsibility of key individuals
is laudable, but the steel industry has not yet proved
itself worthy of this trust.

The position of the union in

the same matter is such that further study is warranted be¬
fore drastic measures are taken, but labor in steel may have
played an important part in the problems of the country with
the industry.
The specific problems of the industry need more
evaluation.

While it does not appear that a great deal of

weight can be placed upon the arguments of the steel companies,
the problems of depreciation and productivity should receive
attention as areas where the industry can use help in solving
its problems.

The areas of costs,

prices,

and profits need

more work in order for a more thorough analysis of legitimacy
of the industry.

The competitive system of the steel firms

needs evaluation and decision for public policy purposes of
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a broad nature;

the steel industry is a representative,

although the practices of the industry may be more important
or widespread than those of other industries.
The exact relation of the steel industry to the entire
economy is debatable,

though without question the industry

can have tremendous impacts on the economy?
of the public interest.

this is one area

Many of these problems will have to

be solved before the people can rest assured that the in¬
dustry acts in the public interest.

The means of dealing

with the industry are not as effective as would be desirable,
and new methods are needed.
The characteristics of the steel industry certainly
do not lend an air of social responsibility and action to
the industry or the officials who run it.

The past behavior

of these men leaves an indelible mark on the history of the
free enterprise system.
Specifically, while wages may help to cause infla¬
tion through industry supply curves and wage income, prices
and profits may also function in similar manner.
evidence to support these contentions.

There is

The steel industry

contributed to the newer push types of inflation during the
1955-58 period.

Whether these forces were always at work is
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not certain, but if not scrutinized they may very well con¬
tinue to be detrimental to society.
The market power of the steel industry is great and
may need alteration.

It is believed that this is already in

progress though the process is slow.
In the labor-management area the parties have taken
steps to reconcile differences through peaceful means,

and

this may eliminate some problems though they should still
be watched;

labor and management together can do as much

damage as they can do separately with the public paying the
bills.
The challenge of economic improvement and outside
competition will be another problem the industry must face.
While industry must face many problems,

it has been shown

that responsibility rests upon all men to work for a better
tomorrow.
The relation of the steel industry to the economy
points out that problems which occur are many faceted,
have many causes;

and

inflation is one problem and recession

and growth present others.

In order for these problems to

be solved in the most efficient manner,

it is necessary that

the forces in society be turned to work for society instead
of against it.

The steel industry has not been helpful in
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past years.
The problem lies in the fact that solutions have not
been reached for the methods of turning these forces to work
for America,

for the steel industry and the public interest.

While Classical competition models do not fit the steel
administrative competition characteristics,

no standards

exist against which to judge the performance of the firms
and officials.

Social responsibility doctrines may not ful¬

fill the requirements.
The above problems represent the meaning of the
crisis in steel, April 1962.
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